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• Significant transformations in urban sanitation systems will be required to address the major  
sanitation challenges affecting many countries. These transformations will involve local governments 
changing how they encourage households and businesses to act in ways that improve sanitation 
outcomes.
• To date, efforts to influence the sanitation-related actions of households and businesses have been 
dominated by two main ideas: firstly, market-based incentives, and secondly, public awareness- 
raising (BCC – behaviour change communication). However, these approaches, either alone or in 
combination, are insufficient. Development and enforcement of regulations is also needed, but  
continues to be highly challenging. In many contexts regulatory agencies lack resources, capacity 
and legitimacy, and violation of regulations rather than compliance is the norm. 
• A “smarter” approach to enforcement and regulation is clearly needed. This paper aims to explore 
key regulatory concepts from literature and practice to provide insight on how the urban sanitation 
sector mightadapt approaches that have been used elsewhere in other sectors (and in some cases 
within the urban sanitation sector). 
• Whilst there is no single definition of “smart enforcement”, this paper uses the term to describe the 
purposeful consideration of the following approaches and concepts when developing and enforcing 
regulations. These approaches extend beyond top-down penalty mechanisms and bottom-up  
communication approaches towards identification of a broader range of options which local  
governments can use to achieve sanitation outcomes: 
o Separation of roles – avoiding conflicting or competing interests by separating the policy,  
     regulatory and implementation functions of government;  
o Enforcement styles – the ways in which regulators interact with regulated organisations or  
     individuals; 
o Responsive regulation (“the regulatory pyramid”) – recognising that different people have  
     different attitudes to wards compliance, and matching the regulatory approach to the attitudes  
     of the target segments; 
o Networked regulation / regulatory alliances – local governments collaborating with other  
     stakeholders to implement enforcement activities; 
o Evidence-based behavioural change communication; 
o Risk-based regulation (“the regulatory matrix”) – matching the level of regulatory effort to the 
     risk non-compliance poses to health or the environment.
• There are a number of regulatory instruments, and combining them is a key element of a smart  
enforcement approach. Their effectiveness will depend on the context. Instruments include: 
o Voluntary approaches, such as information, education and awards; 
o Market-based and price instruments, such as subsidies, taxes, outcome-based contracts; 
o Self-regulation or co-regulation by industry (the regulated parties); 
o Command and control regulation – setting rules and enforcing penalties for non-compliance.
• Monitoring activities and outcomes is critical to establishing the legitimacy of the enforcement sys-
tems. For instance, in the case of onsite systems, this will include monitoring of households’ and 
emptiers’ containment, desludging and disposal actions and outcomes. It is not possible to monitor 
every single activity, but nor is this required for effective monitoring. A smart approach to enforce-
ment will consider random inspections and audits, combined with complementary forms of reporting 
to provide more information (e.g. citizen reporting or self-reporting).
• This paper includes case studies and examples of “smart enforcement” from various countries 
globally (Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Senegal, and Thailand) and 
sectors, including sanitation, waste management, industrial pollution control and food safety. These 
case studies illustrate the potential for “smart enforcement” strategies to be more widely used in the 
sanitation sector, with many valuable lessons to learn from both the successes and challenges.
Key points
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Urban sanitation is one of the most important and urgent challenges confronting countries aiming to 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). More than half of the world’s population now lives 
in urban areas, and sanitation coverage is not keeping up with population growth. Furthermore, even 
where people have access to toilets, wastewater and faecal sludge is commonly not safely contained, 
transported or treated before disposal. In many locations the environmental and health consequences of 
poor sanitation continue to impose significant economic and social costs on communities and countries. 
Conventionally, centralised sewer systems have been regarded the main – and often only – option for 
managing human waste (faeces and urine) in urban settings. Yet, construction of sewers and related 
treatment plants is highly capital intensive, and there remain questions as to whether centralised  
systems are the best option economically, technically and environmentally. Meanwhile, cities have  
primarily developed primarily onsite sanitation technologies, often comprising only primary treatment 
in a pit or septic tank, without significant oversight in either construction or operation. As a result, poor 
sanitation outcomes persist. There is a growing recognition that, in most settings, urban sanitation 
service systems will need to involve a mix of options. This will entail improving existing onsite systems 
as well as further developing decentralised and/or centralised networked solutions. Developing and in-
tegrating these solutions operationally, financially and technically in appropriate ways is now a priority. 
This document is written with this mix of options, and their emerging service delivery models, in mind. 
To achieve sanitation outcomes, a transformation of urban sanitation service delivery systems – and 
how they are regulated – is needed. This will ultimately rely on behavioural change among consumers 
or end-users, and among service providers and governments. Urban stakeholders have grown 
accustomed to, and sometimes even have vested interests in, status quo approaches to sanitation. 
Transforming urban sanitation service delivery means changing and challenging established modes of 
operation, such as inexpensive but unsafe manual emptying services. The range of stakeholders,  
behaviours and actions involved, and their interconnectedness, make achieving behavioural change  
outcomes in urban setting a more complex exercise than in rural settings. The lessons learned from 
rural approaches to sanitation cannot simply be transferred to an urban context. 
Behavioural change in sanitation is dominated by two major ideas. The first idea is incentivising,  
especially through market and financial mechanisms, the private sector to deliver services through in-
novative models. An example is providing incentives for discharge that make it attractive for emptiers 
to dispose of sludge safely. The second idea is to raise public awareness and bring about behaviour 
change, particularly through behavioural change communication (BCC). Whilst both these types of 
approaches are essential, we observe that there are limitations to what can be achieved with either in 
isolation, or even in combination. For example, there are limits to appealing to the collective sense of 
“public good”, and to people’s willingness to prevent harm to the environment and/or the health of the 
wider community. A key imperative to achieve public health in cities and towns is regulation and 
enforcement. 
It is largely indisputable that regulation and enforcement are important for achieving safe and sustain-
able urban sanitation practices. However, in the sector, practitioners, government and the community 
generally have low expectations of implementation. Successful regulation and enforcement in the waste 
and environment sectors are challenging everywhere in the world, particularly in developing countries. 
There appear to be several reasons for this, including limited capacities (skills, number of staff, strate-
gies, political backing) for regulation and enforcement in development countries, poor compliance being 
the norm, and the questionable legitimacy of regulatory agencies, especially if regulation is applied 
unevenly. Also, politicians are often unwilling to pay the political price of enforcing sanitation rules and 
laws on individuals – the benefits might not be visible in the short term, in general they accrue to the 
public rather than to the individuals concerned.
Should we therefore give up on regulation and enforcement in urban sanitation? Or should we simply 
find smarter ways to address these challenges? This paper argues for the latter course, and aims to 
explore the topic by drawing on existing knowledge of regulation and enforcement from inside and 
outside the sanitation sector. 
1. Introduction
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This argument in favour of a “smart enforcement” approach, outlines different strategies to bring 
stakeholders into compliance, using a mix of measures and choosing the most effective use of (limited) 
available resources. We present key concepts and illustrate them with examples.1 This paper should be 
considered as a first step in learning about smart enforcement and its application to the urban sanita-
tion sector. It is not intended to be a comprehensive roadmap. 
In this paper, we focus on smart enforcement from the perspective of local governments as duty 
bearers. We do not comprehensively address the compliance and accountability issues faced by local 
government itself, though this is clearly part of the enabling environment for enforcement.
The structure of this paper is as follows:
• Section 2: What is “smart enforcement”? – This section introduces key concepts and frameworks for 
regulatory policy and practice, to inform a “smart” way of going about enforcement.
• Section 3: Instruments – A list of instrument types to select from.
• Section 4: Compliance monitoring – Mechanisms and strategies for the inspection and monitoring of 
actions by households and businesses.
• Section 5: Case study examples of “smart enforcement” – Draws on a range of examples from 
• sanitation and other sectors.
Other areas of urban sanitation related to this document are covered in the following learning papers 
produced by SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) and the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures, University of Technology Sydney (ISF-UTS). These include:
• Financing sanitation for cities and towns (ISF-UTS and SNV, 2014)
• Septage transfer stations (ISF-UTS and SNV, 2016a)
• Legal and policy aspects of urban sanitation (ISF-UTS and SNV, 2016b) 
• Sanitation planning (ISF-UTS and SNV, 2016c)
1. This paper was informed by: a literature review, a D-Group discussion, and a participatory session at the SNV Desludging 
Learning Event 2015, expert interviews, and a participatory session on smart enforcement at Stockholm World Water Week, 2016. 
Interviewees have not been identified, consistent with ISF-UTS’ ethics in research approach. This paper draws on theories,  
practices and examples from the sanitation and other sectors.
Photo: SNV/A. Dockery
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Key terms and concepts
Enforcement, or the act of enforcing, is defined in the Concise Oxford dictionary (2011) as “compelling 
observance of a law” and “imposing action, conduct or one’s will”. When effective, enforcement will lead 
to compliance. Compliance is defined as “the act or an instance of complying: obedience to a request, 
command etc.” In day-to-day language, enforcement is thus often understood as involving linear and 
top-down strategies to compel people to comply with laws and regulations. However, in practice, 
enforcement and compliance is more complex than this.
There are many different fields and disciplines which investigate how to improve regulation, compliance 
and enforcement, and each has different views about and ways of explaining what is a “smart” 
approach.  There is no single agreed definition of “smart enforcement”, and in this paper our intention 
is to emphasise the possibility of using a broad range of strategies to facilitate compliance. 
In thinking about smart enforcement, it is useful to make a distinction between the “regulators”, usual-
ly local government, and the “regulated”, these can be service providers, households, industry and so 
on. Among the regulated, there will be compliant and non-compliant. Non-compliant organisations or 
individuals could also be called “offenders”. Understanding the different groups involved is key. Smart 
enforcement encompasses more than just looking for the most effective way to identify offenders. It re-
quires looking at the motivations of and constraints on all regulated stakeholders (organisations or indi-
viduals) to identify ways to make it easier for them to comply. This is addressed in the concepts below.
Though regulatory enforcement has not been a focus in urban sanitation so far, we can draw on other 
useful analysis and experience of enforcing environmental and pollution regulations in developed and 
developing countries. There is also work from behavioural change sciences, and economics and gover-
nance that can be useful for this topic. From these various fields, we have identified certain basic con-
cepts that could be useful for smart enforcement in urban sanitation. These are not mutually exclusive:
• Separation of roles
• Enforcement styles
• Responsive regulation 
• Networked regulation
• Evidence-based behavioural change communication
• Risk-based regulation
2.1 Separation of roles
In the WASH sector, particularly in relation to urban water supply services, there is a strong emphasis 
on separating the roles of policy makers, regulators and implementers (or service providers) (World 
Bank, 2006). The main idea is that it is important that the people working in the regulatory agency do 
not have conflicting or competing roles (OECD 2013). In practice however, in urban sanitation, sepa-
ration of roles often does not occur. Both service provision and regulatory functions are the responsi-
bility of the municipality itself and may even lie with the same agency within a municipal government. 
The question then arises whether the agency is capable to separate responsibilities, in particular those 
of service provision and oversight. This includes providing the opportunity for customers, citizens and 
workers to have access to ways of lodging complaints and reporting on levels of service. 
2.2 Enforcement styles
The concept of “enforcement styles” as it relates to developing country contexts, is articulated in  
McAllister (2008). Enforcement styles refers to the ways that regulators interact with regulated organi-
sations or individuals. The nature of these interactions is affected by regulatory agencies’ capacities and 
degrees of autonomy. The degree of autonomy of the regulating agency refers to its level of indepen-
dence from the organisations and/or individuals it is supposed to regulate. Even in a situation of 
2. What is smart enforcement?
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separation of roles, regulated organisations or individuals can, for example, provide advice to agencies 
on the content of regulations, or they may even be able to influence specific decisions. The right  
balance needs to be found, because regulating agencies that do not listen to the regulated organisations 
or individuals might come up with unworkable regulations. Capacity also influences enforcement styles, 
in the sense that under-resourced agencies are more likely to take a reactive strategy rather than  
anticipating potential issues and violations.
Enforcement styles can also differ in regard to whether they follow the letter of the spirit of rules and 
procedures, and in regard to the application of sanctions (castigating or educating the offender). Figure 
1 below gives an overview of the dimensions that can be used to describe an enforcement style. What is 
deemed to be a ‘smart’ enforcement style will depend on the context and will nearly always be  
somewhere in the middle of two extremes.
Being aware of current enforcement styles will help us to understand the relationship between the 
regulating agency and regulated organisations or individuals. In some cases, that relationship may be 
counter-productive, for instance, when it is too repressive, or when the regulating agency is influenced 
too much by the regulated organisations or stakeholders This becomes evident not only in the design of 
regulations but also in the implementation practice. The OECD (2013) states that (the style of) inspec-
tions and enforcement actions have as much influence on the (rate of) compliance as the design of the 
regulation. 
2.3 Responsive regulation
Many regulators from across different sectors, including environmental protection authorities, have 
adopted the theory and principles of responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) to develop 
their compliance strategies. 
Figure 1. Dimensions of enforcement styles (adapted from McAllister (2008)) 
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A responsive regulation approach recognises that different groups will have different attitudes towards 
compliance. Some people (or organisations) are willing to comply, or to try to comply, with regulations, 
and any non-compliance is “accidental”; some will not comply if they can avoid doing so, and their 
non-compliance is “opportunistic”; others deliberately decide not to comply and will go to any lengths 
to by-pass regulations. Using a differential approach to target these different groups is not only more 
respectful, but also a better use of resources.
Given the range of attitudes towards compliance, responsive regulation avoids applying strict, punitive 
penalties as a first response to the non-compliance of first offenders. It recognises that, because some 
people may only inadvertently fail to comply, a better approach is to first try to use cooperative and 
informative mechanisms to respond to non-compliance (see example in box 1). This has two potential 
advantages. Firstly, fewer resources are required for an information response such as a warning letter, 
than for more punitive approaches, such as launching legal proceedings. Secondly, an encouraging, 
cooperative response could help to foster positive relationships between regulators and target groups, 
which in turn has the potential to improve attitudes towards compliance and encourage future com-
pliance (Nielsen and Parker 2009). 
A responsive regulation approach also recognises that a different approach might be needed for repeat 
offenders. If someone repeatedly fails to comply with standards, they will be classified as being asso-
sociated with a higher “risk level”. One possible response it to impose stricter monitoring or reporting 
requirements on that individual or company (OECD 2013).
Responsive regulation also appreciates that there are others who will not generally be interested in 
complying unless the costs of non-compliance outweighs the benefits. As illustrated in figure 2, a  
responsive regulation approach progresses from “gentle” responses to non-compliance, such as  
warning letters, to “moderate” responses such as directions to undertake certain actions or pay a  
penalty, to “strong” punitive responses requiring criminal enforcement. 
Many regulators apply responsive regulation as a staged approach – e.g. first non-compliance might  
involve receiving a warning/information letter, and then progressively stricter approaches for subse-
quent non-compliance. The “regulatory pyramid” assumes that most non-compliers will respond to a 
cooperative approach, reducing the need for escalating to more punitive measures and prosecutions. 
If this model applies, then a small amount of effort to encourage compliance (e.g. advisory letters) will 
persuade a large proportion of the target group to conform, whereas compliance activities that take 
more resources and time (such as prosecutions) need only to be applied to a few non-compliers. An 
example of the regulatory pyramid is shown in figure 2.
Box 1. Responsive regulation in practice: 
  San Fernando City sanitation compliance schedules
In San Fernando City, the Philippines, the City Wastewater Management Council 
(CWMC) is responsible for overseeing compliance with sanitation regulations and 
requirements, including regulations requiring all new businesses and households to 
install adequate wastewater management systems. For those individuals or businesses 
served with notices of violation, a severe penalty is not necessarily applied. The CWMC 
holds regular hearings where the non-compliant parties can be invited to explain the 
situation and identify the factors preventing their compliance. Based on the reasons, 
the CWMC may negotiate with the non-compliant party and establish a schedule or 
plan with a reasonable timeframe for them to achieve compliance.  
Source: Robbins (2011)
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One challenge in applying the responsive regulation approach is that in the waste sector the attitudes, 
and hence effective compliance strategies, are often not distributed in a pyramid shape. For example, 
a review conducted by the Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management (White 
and Heckenberg, 2012) revealed that most of those who were not complying with waste management 
legislation (through illegal dumping) 
were doing so wilfully and intentio-
nally – the pyramid was indeed 
inverted, as illustrated in figure 3. In 
these situations, information/warnings 
are unlikely to have much impact and 
will probably not be the most cost-ef-
fective compliance approach.
Figure 3. An example of an “inverted” 
regulatory pyramid of non-compliance in the 
waste sector (White and Heckenberg (2012))
Figure 2. Example of a regulatory pyramid (adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and NSW EPA (2013))
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Despite these limitations, it is still useful to think about regulation as involving escalating levels of 
enforcement, not only because of resource constraints, but also because it builds a more constructive 
relationship with citizens. 
2.4 Networked regulation and regulatory alliances
There are a number of challenges to applying either conventional top-down or responsive regulatory 
models in developing country contexts (Braithwaite, 2006; Rooij and McAllister, 2014). In particular, 
government authorities are likely to lack the necessary capacity (in resources, technical expertise and 
information) and independence. For example, the following assumptions are often made as regards 
what is required for effective responsive regulation. However, in many situations the conditions required 
for these assumptions to apply will not be present:
1. Implementation of responsive regulation requires good and reliable information about the regulated 
organisations and individuals.
2. Instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, officials need to be able to decide on differential treatment of 
different groups. This assumes technical capacity and also independent decision-making.
3. There needs to be a credible ultimate punishment that will be imposed irrespective of the political 
connections of the offender.
However, Braithwaite (2006) also suggests that the responsive regulatory ideas provide opportunities 
for developing country agencies to draw on capacity and expertise from third-party, non-state actors, 
especially NGOs, to create networks that promote regulatory compliance.  Under this “networked” 
regulation concept, weaker actors with less power can align themselves with stronger actors to colla-
borate on enforcement efforts. Third-party initiatives such as those which focus on transparency 
(“naming and shaming” offenders), recognising strong compliance with awards or publicity, and 
establishing standards, can complement and strengthen the efforts of regulatory agencies. 
Similarly, Rooij and McAllistair (2014) call for “regulatory alliances”. They argue that traditional methods 
of enforcement or behaviour change programs are unlikely to be successful in situations where the re-
gulatory resources are small compared to the large number of violations, and where violation rather 
than compliance is the norm. Regulatory alliances focus both on combining instruments – such as 
combining punitive threats with an education campaign – and on enlisting a range of stakeholders to 
implement such activities. For example, one approach to extending resources, and to garnering public 
support for environmental outcomes, could be to pay citizens to report on pollution incidents that are 
subsequently verified. A further example of a network alliance to extend inspection capacity is provided 
from Mexico in box 9 (in section 4.2).
2.5 Evidence-based behavioural change communication
Behavioural change communication is an approach that uses an in-depth understanding of people’s 
behaviour to design persuasive communication, and it has often been applied to hygiene promotion 
and sanitation demand creation (SNV 2015d). Experience and concepts from behavioural change com-
munication in the WASH and broader health sectors can provide insights into why some organisations 
(or individuals) comply and others do not. This understanding in turn, can help to inform enforcement 
strategies, and potentially make them more effective.
The starting point for evidence-based BCC is in-depth investigation and analysis of the motivations 
underlying the practices of individuals in target groups – this involves investigating what motivates 
them to engage in some behaviours and not others. This analysis aims at better understanding human 
behaviour and is often described as ‘formative research’. The insights gained form the basis for deve-
lopment of key messages for targeted groups. The factors that influence behaviour are often referred to 
as behavioural determinants. They can include knowledge, skills, social norms, values, priorities, fears, 
abilities etc. 
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In the literature, there are many behavioural frameworks. Different frameworks group ‘behavioural 
determinants’ in different ways, and emphasise different aspects. The choice of framework depends on 
underlying theories about behavioural change, and on matching the chosen framework to the situation 
or context at hand. For example, research into behavioural determinants affecting HIV risk behaviour 
emphasises a different range of behavioural determinants than research into selling and using toilets.2 
The latter will focus on product attributes, for example. Whatever framework is chosen, it is important 
to remember that any framework is just a tool to help organise information. It cannot replace expertise 
and analysis, which in SNV’s experience, is a critical component in meaningful formative research.  
Key steps in undertaking formative research include clearly identifying the target group, the focus 
behaviour and the desired behaviour (behavioural objective). Behaviours related to regulation in urban 
sanitation can be expected to be less embedded in emotional and identity concerns than, for example, 
personal hygiene behaviours. It can be assumed that most cases of non-compliance will be related to 
practical issues and cost-benefit trade-offs. A barrier analysis3 might thus be a good place to start, pref-
erably combined with a doer/non-doer analysis. Other frameworks are: Evo-eco4, Ranas5, FOAM6, and 
SaniFOAM7. Most of these were designed to research personal hygiene and purchase behaviours.
The results of formative research should inform the identification of a communication objective8, which 
together with a creative brief can inform the design of a communication campaign. However, such a 
communication campaign would only be a part of a broader package of interventions or measures, 
which together should shift the balance in favour of compliance. Both the communication campaign and 
the broader package could usefully be informed by the key behavioural determinants identified in the 
formative research (Halcrow et al 2014).
A key issue in urban sanitation with regard to behavioural determinants is that the negative conse-
quences of certain practices may be experienced, not by the individual, but by the environment, or the 
population at large. Meanwhile, there may be benefits at an individual level that may encourage parti-
cular behaviour (e.g. not complying with construction regulations or using desludging methods that may 
reduce costs). Designing enforcement approaches that address this situation therefore needs formative 
research that provides an understanding of the motivations of the target group to practice the offense.
2.6 Risk-based regulation - the “regulatory” framework
Adopting a risk-based approach to regulation means that the regulatory efforts and resources spent by 
a regulatory authority are proportionate to the risk of harm due to non-compliance. As illustrated in 
figure 4, potential activities/behaviours to regulate can be mapped on a “likelihood-consequence” 
matrix. The approach to estimating the level of risk, where: 
risk = likelihood * consequence of non-compliance
is widely used across many sectors (see e.g. ref ISO 9001). In an urban sanitation context, the risks to 
the environment and public health are considered highest when both the likelihood of non-compliance is 
high, and the impact (on health or the environment) is high. Where risks are higher, these are subject 
to stricter controls – see for example box 2.
2. This does not deny the fact that significant learning can be enabled through exploring behavioural change frameworks across
      different sectors.
3. See, for example, http://barrieranalysis.fh.org/
4. See, for example, http://ehg.lshtm.ac.uk/the-evo-eco-approach/
5. See Contzen, N., Mosler, H.J. (2015). RANAS (Risks, Attitudes, Norms, Abilities, and Self-regulation) methodological fact    
      sheets - 6 methodological fact sheets on behavior change. Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag),
      Dübendorf, Switzerland . Available at http://www.susana.org/en/resources/library/details/2397
6. See http://www.wsp.org/hwws-toolkit/behavior-change
7. See http://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/GSP_sanifoam.pdf
8. Having a clear communication objective and a broad consensus as well as understanding of this communication objective is
      often a key factor for success. It is not uncommon that formative research is done, a communication campaign is designed,
      but that during implementation, front line workers do not fully understand or buy-in to the main objective and message.
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Box 2. Risk-based regulation in practice: 
            Greywater reuse regulation
In Australia there is great interest in reusing and recycling wastewater, driven by 
drought and water security concerns. This includes an interest in households and 
organisations reusing greywater, which is water from taps and showers, within the 
home, on gardens, or in parks and sportsgrounds.
Laws and regulations vary across states, but in general government health and water 
resource departments apply a risk-based approach to regulating greywater use, in 
order to manage public health risks. Where a higher risk to public health from poor 
water quality is expected – based on the likelihood of exposure – stricter rules and 
requirements apply. 
Figure 4. Example of a risk matrix (source: EPA VIC (2011, p. 7)) 
At the SNV Learning Event on Professionalisation of Emptying Services, the regulatory matrix was used 
to map actions by households and emptiers along the faecal sludge management (FSM) service chain 
(SNV 2015c). Those elements which were rated “high risk” could be targeted as priorities for com-
pliance efforts (see figure 4 for an example).
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Box 2. Continued 
The regulatory frameworks for different risk levels include the following measures: 
  
• Lower risk – Manual collection of greywater for immediate use outside on gar-
dens is considered low risk. The government provides information about the risks 
of storage, but no specific rules apply.
• Medium risk – Installing a greywater diversion system (e.g. from a multi-unit 
building into a storage tank for future reuse) is considered to pose some risks.  
Local government regulations generally require council approval for greywater 
diversion. However, exemptions are possible if all of the following conditions are 
met: prior approval is sought and obtained; the household or organisation can 
demonstrate that the system is installed in accordance with industry codes of  
practice and performance standards; the local utility is informed; and the system 
does not otherwise pose a risk to the environment.  
• High risk – Drinking greywater is considered high risk and systems which enable 
this to happen are banned for individual households. Through audits and other 
measures, the regulator works with plumbing industry organisations to ensure that 
cross-connections do not occur. Recycled water systems that treat and reuse grey-
water or sewage (e.g. in toilets, washing machines, showers and for irrigation) are 
subject to stringent regulatory requirements (inspections, audits, reporting, both 
pre- and post-commissioning) to protect health and the environment, and these in 
turn require considerable government resources to administer.
Source: NSW Government (2008)
Photo: SNV/A. Dockery
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Combining and mixing policy instruments has long been advocated to achieve the goals of environmen-
tal management and policy, in areas ranging from pollution control to sustainable resource allocation.
As outlined in section 2, applying instruments in combination can be an effective way to achieve smart 
enforcement because of the range of motivations that influence and enable behaviour – at an indivi-
dual level, as well as across individuals in a target group. Effective enforcement strategies often include 
a number of instruments, selected and developed in such a way that in combination they are the best 
option in terms of cost and effort. 
Whatever the strategy, providing information and creating awareness will always be needed to make 
enforcement work. Information needs to be provided to target audiences about:
• the reasons for the regulation; and
• how to comply or change behaviour.
There are many ways to categorise the regulatory instruments that can be applied to influence people’s 
actions. The following categorisation is commonly used: voluntary approaches (including information/
education); market-based incentives; industry self-regulation; and command-and-control approaches. 
It should be noted that options under “command-and-control” that involve state coercion require a legal 
basis, that is, laws and regulations specifying what actions or behaviour are illegal. For urban sanitation, 
this legal basis is often missing. In the absence of a formal legal basis, regulatory agencies will need to 
develop their own by-laws, regulations and rules, or are reliant on the other three instrument categories 
– market incentives or disincentives and voluntary citizen (or service provider) action. Note that some 
market incentive/disincentive instruments also require the establishment of new laws or regulations. 
 
The different instrument categories are described in table 1 below.
Instrument category  
and description
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Voluntary approaches – including 
information, education and awards.
Non-coercive Can have low impact
Market-based instruments – also 
called “economic” or “price-based” 
instruments. They include subsidies, 
taxes, tax waivers and trading 
schemes. Output- and outcome-based 
contracts could be considered a form of 
price-based instrument.
Can be economically efficient Outcomes can be uncertain.  
Requires getting the price and 
design right. 
Can have high administrative 
requirements.
Self-regulation – industry establishes 
a code of conduct and processes for 
compliance / industry accreditation. 
Could include independent auditing or, 
in a co-regulatory model, a role for 
government to assist in ensuring 
compliance.
Self-policing can help “raise 
the bar” from within industry, 
raise expectations in the 
market for higher quality, 
and create momentum 
towards improvement.
Can have low reliability.  
Requires other drivers and incentives 
for industry to self-regulate (such as 
threat of regulation, or reputation 
concerns).
Command and control regulation 
(the “regulatory approach”) – set 
rules and laws, and enforce non-
compliance with penalties.
Clarity about expectations 
and outcomes but only if 
enforced.
Enforcement requirements high.  
Lacks flexibility.  
Coercive.
Table 1. Potential advantages and disadvantages of different categories of instruments  
              (adapted from various sources, including Gunningham and Sinclair (1999))
3. Instruments
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3.1 Voluntary approaches
Voluntary approaches aim to appeal to people’s values, norms or self-interest. Any enforcement cam-
paign will need to include communication and awareness raising, or people will not be aware of its 
existence. In a voluntary approach, the expectation is that this communication and awareness will lead 
to behaviour change. Voluntary approaches can include, for example: 
• Awareness and public recognition of those who comply.
• Recognising and fostering leadership in the industry and community.
• Technical guidance, training, mentoring and assistance. 
• Training, certification and accreditation. 
Box 3 describes an example, which involves understanding the technical barriers to compliance and 
providing information in response.
 
In solid waste, public health and WASH there are many promotion campaigns, generally with an expec-
tation of increased compliance. Experience in behavioural change communication shows that success 
should not be assumed, and that monitoring and fine-tuning is essential to make such campaigns effec-
tive. It has also been found that in many cases compliance rates drop once campaigns are discontinued.
3.2 Market-based instruments
Market-based instruments are also called “economic” instruments because they aim to influence 
behaviour and actions through economic (price-based) incentives. Taxes imposed to discourage 
“undesirable” behaviour and subsidies to encourage “preferred” actions are forms of market-based 
instruments. Examples of payment instruments are provided in box 4 and box 5. Market-based trading 
schemes, such as tradeable emissions permits, are also market-based instruments.
Box 3. Voluntary approaches in practice:  
            Marikina City, Philippines
Community peer pressure and pride are strong motivators for improving sanitation, 
and in Marikina City a promotion campaign was core to success. To promote participa-
tion in the city’s desludging program, window stickers were provided for participating 
customers to engender a sense of community among those who participated in the 
program. The awareness raising campaign also tapped into local pride about having 
healthy, clean waterways, and emphasised the direct link between desludging and 
environmental conditions.
The program also sought to understand the barriers to participa-
tion in the local context. For example, when the city realised that 
difficulties in accessing or removing septic tank lids was a key bar-
rier, they ensured that they provided households with information 
about which private service providers could do this for a small fee.
 
Source: Robbins et al. (2012) and interviews with stakeholders
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Examples of market-based instruments include: 
• Fees or bill rebates to households for desludging as per schedule.
• Tax concessions for compliance.
• License or permit fee rebates (e.g. reduced fees for truck operators) to demonstrate continuous 
track record of compliance.
• Output- or outcome-based contracts, with payment on delivery, on the provision of evidence of 
• compliance, such as a payment for delivery to a safe disposal site.
• Revenue-neutral “feebates”, which combine fees on undesirable products or activities (e.g. high 
emission vehicles) with rebates (financed by revenue from the fees) for preferred products or  
activities (e.g. low emission vehicles).
There are debates about the appropriateness of rewarding “preferred” actions such as desludging or 
safe disposal, particularly when this involves financial incentives. Critics of such financial incentives are 
concerned that they set up expectations, which mean that rewards are required for actions that protect 
public health and the environment. The appropriateness of financial incentives will depend on the 
situation, the target group, affordability and market characteristics. Offering rebates or reduced fees is 
another option. Although the financial costs may be similar to those associated with direct payments, 
the impacts are different in terms of setting norms.
Box 4. Market-based instruments in practice: 
            Subsidies for sludge collection, treatment and disposal 
Examples of payments to incentivise sludge management activities include:
• In Patong city, Thailand, subsidies from the central and local government support 
both faecal sludge collection and treatment. Furthermore, Paton city provides tax 
incentives to private sector companies to support the city in FS collection. 
• In Baliwag, the Philippines, payment is made to collectors based on performance- 
based contracts. Baliwag Water District (BWD) pays a fixed annual rate to contrac-
tors and controls them closely with GPS truck monitoring and surprise inspections. 
If the contracting operator does not fulfil their responsibilities according to the  
contract, then BWD writes a letter of complaint to the contracting company, which 
can be used to justify non-payment of the full rate for the contractor’s services. 
• In Faridpur, Bangladesh, a business model has been developed where pit emptiers 
are paid by households as well as the treatment plant operator when they deliver  
sludge to the newly constructed treatment and composting plant. This is made 
possible through subsidies by the municipality to the treatment plant operator, 
using income from the lease of machinery to the pit emptiers. A challenging aspect 
has been to estimate revenue from emptying services and composting services, 
as well as to maintain 6 ongoing efforts in the form of service demand generation 
and awareness raising campaigns using street drama, cycling events, cleanliness 
drives, and quiz contests to prevent illegal connections to drains.
Sources: Taweesan et al (2017); SNV (2015c); de La Brosse et al (2017)
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3.3 Self-regulation and co-regulation
Self-regulation involves an industry, business, professional or community group voluntarily developing 
and applying codes of conduct, standards or rules. The group involved also develops and implements 
the procedures and requirements for monitoring, compliance, reporting and enforcement. Industry- 
based accreditation arrangements are one example of self-regulation. Another is the norms agreed to in 
an open defecation free (ODF) community.
“Co-regulatory” models have similarities to self-regulatory models. In co-regulatory situations, a  
government authority might review or help develop the relevant code of conduct. A co-regulatory  
model could involve government legislating to provide a legal basis for an industry-designed system. 
For example, participation in the scheme might be voluntary for individual businesses, but once they 
sign up they may be obliged by law to follow the code or rules. In this situation, the potential incentive 
for businesses to sign up is the market advantage of accreditation. 
Whilst self-regulation is voluntary in the sense that the industry is not compelled by law to set up the 
system, the prospect of governments imposing a mandatory, government-led regulatory system if 
self-regulation fails can motivate an industry to self-organise and establish a compliance system. An  
example of a self-regulatory system, co-designed by industry and government, is illustrated in box 6; 
box 8 illustrates an alternative model of self-regulation, based on industry accreditation.
Self-regulatory and co-regulatory systems have certain advantages, and if implemented appropriately 
they may successfully achieve regulatory outcomes. However, this is not guaranteed, and there remains 
a risk of high levels of influence by regulated parties, which could ultimately lower standards (“regulato-
ry capture”). Whilst these approaches involve the regulated parties, they still require concerted effort on 
the part of governments as well as good knowledge of the issues at hand. Co-regulation should not be 
seen as a way for governments to reduce staff costs and fill gaps in their expertise.
Box 5. Market-based instruments in combination with other instruments: 
            Hazardous asbestos waste disposal, Australia 
The underlying framework for asbestos disposal in Australian states is essentially 
regulatory. There are quite strong penalties, including possible jail terms, for dumping 
asbestos. However, a key barrier is that the fees for disposing of asbestos at waste 
disposal facilities are often high, due to the hazardous nature of the substance.
The state of NSW has introduced a scheme to address this financial disincentive, 
whilst at the same time promoting safe disposal. The state government sponsors local 
governments to waive the landfill fee (about $200/tonne) and households also get a 
payment of $50/tonne of asbestos for up to 5 tonnes (a relatively small cost, especial-
ly compared to the overall cost of doing building works, but probably still enough to 
be worth the effort). This is tied to households being paid for wrapping the asbestos 
safely. Some local governments also provide households with free “households asbes-
tos disposal kits” with wrapping, personal protection equipment and instructions.
Source: NSW EPA (2016)
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3.4 Regulatory (command-and-control) approaches
The “conventional” regulatory approach sets rules (standards, laws/ordinances, or licence conditions), 
monitors and inspects actions or outputs, and enforces penalties for non-compliance. Examples include: 
banning activities or products outright, or licensing or permitting certain activities (see box 7). 
A range of penalties of varying severity can be applied. These include:
• Requiring an offender to monitor and report certain activities (this can include self-reporting);
• Directing an offender to undertake a particular activity, such as a clean-up or repair; 
• Publicising an offender’s failure to comply; 
• Fines and monetary penalties;
• Criminal penalties. 
Command-and-control regulation needs an effective system of monitoring and inspection, and the  
capacity to impose penalties. Often, it also requires effective institutions (police, the judiciary) to  
monitor compliance and adjudicate over disputes. As mentioned before, it also requires the legal basis 
to impose compliance.
Box 6. Self-regulation in practice: 
            Product stewardship  
Product stewardship schemes aim to manage the impacts of the disposal of products 
and materials. In particular, they aim to involve those who produce, sell, use and 
dispose of products so that they have a shared responsibility to manage the impact of 
those products on human health and safety. 
Product stewardship schemes can be self-regulatory, co-regulatory or mandatory. 
Many are self-regulatory schemes in which the industry involved in manufacturing or 
selling a product self-organises to set up a scheme for safe reuse or recycling of the 
products at the end of their useful life. Self-regulatory schemes are essentially volun-
tary, but part of the impetus for developing the scheme may be the threat of a more 
regulatory approach being imposed by government. Self-regulatory schemes may also 
be underpinned by legislation, which sets frameworks for government agencies to 
endorse the scheme. 
One example of a product stewardship scheme in Australia is the scheme for end-of-
life tyres. The environmental impacts of illegal dumping of tyres include toxic fumes 
from fires and the potential for vector breeding. All stakeholders in the tyre supply 
chain may become participants in the voluntary scheme, and they commit to safe 
disposal or recycling. Extending participation in the scheme also has the potential to 
increase the scale of the market for recycled products.
Source: Australian Government Department of Environment and Energy (2016)
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Box 8. Self-regulation in practice: 
            Industry accreditation   
One approach to industry self-regulation is for an industry to establish minimum 
standards in product design, construction or service delivery that participating busi-
nesses must comply with in order to be accredited. The industry itself establishes the 
standards and the mechanisms for checking compliance with these standards. The 
requirements might include participation in training, self-reporting and industry- 
organised inspections to monitor quality. 
Self-accreditation schemes can help enhance the reputation of the whole industry in 
terms of quality of service or production provision. It also differentiates between those 
in the industry who are accredited and those who are not. The market advantages of 
accreditation can be significant, and the incentive for companies to maintain accredi-
tation can also be substantial. 
Self-accreditation schemes can potentially reduce the regulatory efforts required by 
government. However, there is a role for government to act as a customer of servi- 
ces or products (rather than a regulator) to exert direct market influence through the 
large-scale purchasing, and also indirect market influence by promoting the legitimacy 
of a self-accreditation scheme. For example, if the plumbing industry in a particular 
jurisdiction were to put in place a self-accreditation scheme, the relevant government 
could set its procurement rules such that only plumbers who are accredited are eligi-
ble to provide services to government agencies.
See also: Mok et al. (2010), Hepburn (2007)
Box 7. Command-control approaches in practice: 
            Penalties for not desludging   
In a few cities in the Philippines, a range of instruments are applied to promote septage 
management. In locations such as Alabel, Marikina and Dumaguete these are under-
pinned by a clear set of enforced local ordinances. The main penalties on households 
for not desludging are notices, followed by fines. 
Ordinances specify:
• septic tank construction standards – pre-occupancy inspection of new septic tanks;
• commercial pre-treatment programs;
• designated places for septage disposal;
• periodic and regular desludging.
Sources: AECOM and Sandec-Eawag (2010), OXFAM (2016), IWA (2014), SNV (2015c)
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For an enforcement strategy to be effective, three things need to happen. Firstly, enforcement activities 
need to be implemented and with quality. Secondly, the enforcement activities need to be successful in 
changing the behaviour of the regulated individuals or entities, and ensuring compliance. Thirdly, these 
behaviour changes or compliance need to lead to the desired outcomes (figure 5).
Monitoring is used to evaluate the extent to which these three things happened, and if not, where the 
issues lie. This section focuses on the second point above (‘greater compliance’), and assumes that 
internal monitoring in regulatory agencies (‘quality of implementation of enforcement activities’) will 
identify whether or not activities have been implemented, and with what level of quality. Nevertheless, 
keeping this performance issue in mind remains important, because it is not unusual to be one of the 
causes of ineffectiveness. Monitoring of the third point (‘desired outcomes’), can involve monitoring of 
sector performance indicators such as the percentage of sludge disposed in a treatment plant, water 
quality etc. It is assumed that established KPI’s exist to monitor such outcomes. It would be valuable 
though to link to that information when efforts are made to improve compliance. When improved  
compliance does not lead to improved outcomes, the efforts may need to be redirected.
4.1 Monitoring whether behaviour is compliant
Monitoring households’ and emptiers’ containment, desludging and disposal activities is a critical ele-
ment of any smart enforcement strategy. In the traditional regulatory model, if laws and ordinances 
are established mandating behaviour, then inspections and monitoring – and clear agreement on who 
is responsible for and has authority to conduct monitoring – is needed to identify any non-compliant 
actions. Monitoring is also needed to ensure compliance with market-based approaches; for example, 
if payments or rebates are available for safe disposal, then processes are needed to check whether this 
has occurred and whether payment should be made. 
 
The robust monitoring of compliance is an important factor in establishing the legitimacy of the enforce-
ment system – that is, there needs to be a credible likelihood of non-compliant activity being detected. 
However, monitoring, inspections, and obtaining information about activities are costly exercises for the 
regulating authority. There are also limitations, depending on the local context, on the local political or 
community appetite for monitoring and enforcement activities. Often it is not possible to monitor every 
single activity, nor is this required for an effective monitoring system. A smart approach to enforcement 
will consider the likelihood of non-compliance to determine random inspections and audits, combined 
with for example citizen reporting or self-reporting to provide more information.
There are a number of choices to make and issues to address in designing a monitoring and inspection 
system for a particular compliance issue. As outlined in Blanc (2012), these include:
• Clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of agencies (for information collection and storage) 
to reduce duplication, ensure comprehensiveness, and increase clarity for both the regulators and 
the regulated.
• Transparently providing information about enforcement requirements and guidance, so that indivi- 
duals and businesses know what they are expected to do, and what they can expect from inspec-
tors.
• Applying a risk-based approach to allocating resources, planning and implementing inspections (see 
section 2.6 above).
4. Compliance monitoring
Figure 5. Key steps of an effective enforcement strategy
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To ensure a monitoring and inspection system is as efficient as possible, the aim should be to avoid 
duplication of information collection efforts. Information required for compliance may already be availa-
ble through other channels, such as taxation databases, which often contain useful information such as 
types of new buildings constructed, and types of businesses (see box 10 in section 4.2).
It is also important to define and communicate (in regulations, by-laws or guidelines) the appropriate 
indicators or standards to avoid disputes that will arise if what is compliant is left open to inspector 
interpretation. For example, whilst it may be obvious that the act of dumping into a waterway is illegal, 
in the case of septic tanks or occupational health and safety, the regulator needs to specify what the 
details of what is considered compliant construction (e.g. refer to standards) or actions (e.g. refer to 
standards or guidelines on protective equipment and other emptying requirements).
Furthermore, additional ways to collect information could be considered, including:
• scheduled or random inspections; 
• regular or random audits;
• reports from community (citizen monitoring);
• combining information from other regulatory authorities (e.g. water quality in waterways);
• self-reporting (can be combined with periodic or random inspections, so auditing the reports);
• investigations (of breaches).
The decision to include additional sources of information should take into account the existing capacity, 
additional costs as well as its vulnerability for gaming or providing false information. The advantages 
and disadvantages of different approaches are outlined below in table 2.
Compliance information 
source
Potential advantages Potential disadvantages
Inspections – e.g. inspecting 
septic tank construction, 
desludging activities, or 
disposal. Can be scheduled or 
random. 
• Provides reliable information, if 
inspection governance is sound
• Resource intensive




– e.g. water quality in drains 
and rivers close to septic tanks 
• Useful for detecting breaches without 
entering properties
• Can be used to determine whether a 
permit or license system is working
• Difficult to demonstrate the causal 





• Shifts cost burden to the regulated 
parties
• May provide extensive information
• If combined with random inspections/
auditing and appropriate penalties for 
mis-reporting, can encourage truthful 
reporting
• Relies on integrity and capability of 
regulated party to provide 
information
• Places cost burden on regulated 
parties
Citizen monitoring • Can detect non-compliance that would 
otherwise go undetected
• Can engender a sense of community 
pride in promoting compliance
• Sporadic, not consistent 
information
• May mean inaccurate reporting
• May put citizens at risk of reprisal
• May be mis-used by citizens to 
address other grievances
Table 2. Potential advantages and disadvantages of different sources of compliance information (adapted from Inece (2009))
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4.2 Data innovations for compliance monitoring
There is significant interest in the potential role for data collection, transfer, storage and analysis tech-
nologies to assist in compliance monitoring. The use of such technology does not remove the need for 
the clear allocation of responsibilities, roles and authority. However, the speed, scale and accessibility of 
technologies related to data management can lead to new and innovative ways to collect information, 
involve the wider community in monitoring, and store and manage data. Also, automated data collec-
tion technology often is more easily accepted as more reliable evidence by stakeholders. One example 
is the use of GPS to track the movement of sludge trucks to ensure safe disposal (see case study in 
section 5.2). Of course, technology changes but does not replace the role of personnel to conduct data 
entry and analysis; clear incentives and roles are still needed to support those activities. Also, situating 
the technology in the local institutional setting often requires more time than expected.
As outlined above in section 2.4, there are opportunities for state agencies to form networks or alliances 
with other government or non-government actors to extend the resource base available to conduct 
inspections and hence increase the effectiveness of inspection regimes. Examples from Mexico and 
Bangladesh are presented in box 9 and box 10.
Box 9. Inspections: 
  Mexico’s Private Auditors  
Mexico’s National Environmental Audit Program was instituted by the Mexican environ-
mental enforcement agency, Profepa (Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Medio  
Ambiente) in the 1990s. This program aimed to complement the Mexican government’s 
strict enforcement campaign to limit pollution by industrial facilities. Since its introduc-
tion, the Audit Program has been extended to cover the majority of the country’s large 
industrial establishments.
Participating facilities select an auditor from a pre-approved list, to perform an audit in 
accordance with established Profepa “terms of reference”. The auditor then proposes a 
plan of action listing all actions necessary for the facility to comply with the law. A writ-
ten agreement is established between Profepa and the facility, with a time period for the 
company to progress activities towards compliance.
There are several incentives for companies to join this voluntary program. They include:
• Exemption from sanctions: Participating facilities are covered by a guarantee which 
ensures that they will not be sanctioned for violations found in the audit. 
• Risk-management: The agency will not conduct enforcement inspections whilst the 
company is progressing with its compliance actions, as long as there are no public 
compliants or incidents.
• Reputational benefits: Environmental certificates are awarded on successful comple-
tion, which commend and recognise environmental performance and can be used for 
publicity (e.g. Certificates of Tourism Environmental Quality).
Source: Van Rooij and McAllister (2014)
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Box 10. Compliance with the Bangladesh National Building Code (BNBC) 
                for sanitation facilities in Khulna, Bangladesh 
Septic tank construction is regulated through the Bangladesh National Building Code 
(BNBC). However, compliance with this regulation remains inadequately enforced both 
by Khulna Development Authority (KDA), which has responsibility for approval of new 
building construction, and the Khulna City Corporation (KCC), which is responsible 
for waste management. Within KDA, there is no designated role and no guidelines 
for checking the compliance of the sanitary components of buildings with the BNBC. 
Further, there is limited capacity within this agency to perform this role. In recent 
years, it relied on three staff to inspect and approve 700 buildings per year. KDA does 
not demand detailed drawings of the septic tank as part of the approval of the building 
development plan, and often the information provided only includes the location of the 
septic tank and not its size and chamber details. Approvals are given before construc-
tion starts, and no proper inspections are done at later stages to ensure construction 
is done according to the plan submitted. Moreover, neither KDA nor KCC provides any 
completion or occupancy certificate. The BNBC states that a licensed plumber should 
issue a completion certificate for the sanitary system, but there is no such practice, 
and nor is there a system for licensing and certifying plumbers. SNV has been working 
in collaboration with KDA and KCC to address this situation.
Under a proposed joint KDA-KCC building construction approval process and action 
plan (see diagram below) KDA would revise its guidelines for building construction  
applications and provide clear guidelines for incorporating septic tank design and 
sanitation plans in the building plan approval application. Further, under the proposed 
plan, in addition to the regular zoning, access and set-back assessment, KDA would 
conduct a ‘plinth level inspection’ to ensure that construction, including the septic 
tank, has been made as per guidelines and drawings in the development applica-
tion. In addition, KCC would issue an ‘occupancy certificate’ after ensuring that the 
building’s sanitary system met the appropriate standards. This ‘occupancy certificate’ 
should act as a key to obtaining a holding number, a utility connection and approval to 
receive other municipal services. For other smaller cities, where development authori-
ties do not exist, the municipality will play both roles. It is also proposed that the KCC 
performs this role with the assistance of the ward level office.
Figure 6. Key steps of an  
effective enforcement strategy
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This section includes five case studies of approaches to “smart enforcement” from sanitation and other 
sectors, in developing and developed countries. They highlight the experiences and the challenges, in 
practice, of applying innovative enforcement strategies in a range of contexts.
5.1 Enforcing safe dumping by private emptiers in Bandung, Indonesia, 
      and in Patna, India
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• citizen monitoring of illegal dumping
• use of technology for both permitting and monitoring
• targetting of police resources to regulatory efforts which would yield the highest outcomes,
• combining financial, punitive and market opportunity measures to incentivise safe dumping
• a responsive approach to permitting that recognised the initial capacity constraints of private emptiers, and 
progressively increased standards from low to high over time, to encourage participation and overall quality 
improvement.
The cities of Bandung in Indonesia and Patna in India have both faced the major challenge of illegal 
sludge dumping by private emptiers. Bandung does not have a sludge treatment plant, and the only 
safe disposal site, the waste treatment plant (WTP), is located a considerable distance from the city. 
The high fines for illegal dumping have rarely if ever been imposed due to difficulties in monitoring, and 
therefore they have not acted as a disincentive for illegal dumping. The combination of high transport 
costs to the WTP and lack of effective enforcement resulted in a high incidence of illegal sludge disposal 
into natural waterways. A similar situation was observed in Patna. Private emptying was not legitima-
tised by government, and operators lacked access to a safe disposal site. Private emptiers were not 
allowed to discharge at the existing sewage treatment plant and even if they were, it was not conve- 
niently located. Further, operators were harassed by government officials and the police for running 
illegitimate businesses.
Using different strategies, both cities aimed to establish financially feasible access to safe disposal sites 
for emptiers and a system for monitoring of illegal dumping. In the case of Bandung, the approach con-
sisted of a system of disposal permits supported by police enforcement and community surveillance. In 
Patna, a system of disposal permits is also being implemented, however this is being supported through 
an engagement process in which the municipality relates to private emptiers as partners rather than 
offenders.
The following sections describe the smart compliance approaches adopted in each city in greater detail.
Bandung, Indonesia 
In Bandung, sanitation is the responsibility of the local go- 
vernment water supply agency (PDAM). The PDAM addressed 
the issue of access to safe disposal sites by establishing a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a selected group 
of 17 private emptiers who are awarded disposal permits to 
discharge at sewer manholes. Permits are awarded annually, 
with payments (estimated on the number of trips per month) 
due monthly.  
5. Case examples
Figure 7. Bandung disposal sticker permit  
(source: World Bank 2016, p. 31)
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The private emptiers were selected based on a number of criteria including the condition of equipment 
and business administration capacity. Initially, these criteria were loosely applied to encourage and 
enable many of the existing businesses to participate in the system. This was important to ensure the 
scheme was supported and successful, and to address illegal dumping. The restriction on the number of 
available permits, at least initially, also afforded some “market protection” to the emptiers and provided 
them with an incentive to sign up.
MoU signings were also witnessed by local police, who ensure that only those emptiers with permits 
empty into the sewer system. Fines can be imposed on emptiers who access the sewer system but do 
not hold a permit. This approach has shifted compliance monitoring away from the almost impossible 
task of detecting illegal dumping in waterways in the wider region, to the more feasible monitoring 
of truck access to sewer manholes within the city boundaries. Monitoring is made easy because each 
licensed emptier also receives a large, visible permit sticker, with a different colour each month (see 
figure 7). The PDAM has also launched a campaign to expand surveillance and the reporting of illegal 
dumping. They have encouraged the community – through a form of citizen monitoring – to use smart 
phones to take photographs and report illegal dumping.
Patna, India 
The system of disposal permits of Patna city, gives the private emptiers access to the 24 lifting stations 
spread across the city linked the sludge treatment plant (STP). For tipping at these disposal points,  
private emptiers need to be registered with the concerned government authority by paying a fixed fee 
of $15 per year and pay a tipping fee of $4.5 per trip. Upon failing of disposing the sludge in to the  
designated places, the registration is cancelled and emptiers are subject to being barred from operating.
In the current scenario, the STP and lifting stations are yet to be opened for disposal. Thus, currently 
operators can dispose in to the open. However, government has opened one lifting station for disposal 
as a pilot to understand the behaviour of the STP. Based on the outcomes government will decide on the 
locations of the remaining lifting stations.
Although this system offers the operators some legitimacy and prevents them from possible troubles, in 
the absence of an effective mechanism to monitor and penalise illegal dumping, the costs of the dispo- 
sal permits counterbalance as a disincentive. Instead operators may prefer to remain elusive and  
unwilling to conform to safer practices.
To address this, extensive engagement and consultation with private emptiers is being conducted. This 
is aimed at building trust and bridging a communication gap between emptiers and government as the 
problem is understood. The process has involved identifying and initiating one to one interactions with 
private emptiers, which eventually led to frequent meetings involving various private emptiers. These 
interactions and meetings served to discuss common concerns of operators and issues related to the 
safe disposal, including the government’s position of imposing a registration and tipping fee to cover 
the costs of building a support infrastructure of surveillance and management. A surveillance plan has 
also been developed and discussed with the private emptiers. This proposes that the disposal sites are 
monitored by installing closed circuit television (CCTV) camera and keeping record of each of the ope- 
rators while tipping at the designated places. This is aimed at ensuring that disposal is happening at the 
designated locations and prevent false reporting by emptiers. Simultaneously Municipal field inspectors 
will be trained to monitor the operators on a random basis.
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5.2 Mobile phone monitoring of private emptier performance, Solo, Indonesia
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• use of technology for monitoring private emptiers;
• combining BCC, financial incentives (that raised neede revenue) with innovative monoitoring approaches.
Previously, the city of Solo faced sanitation risks at two key points of the FSM service chain. Firstly, 
there was no scheduled desludging program, and demand for desludging was low and emptying  
occurred on an irregular basis. Secondly, sludge was dumped illegally into local rivers.
The PDAM collaborated with USAID and IU-WASH to implement a set of initiatives to encourage regular 
emptying and safe disposal, including a program of regular scheduled desludging. Emptiers were  
contracted to conduct regular desludging at private households, and this was financed by including a 
compulsory levy to cover desludging services in residential water bills. An awareness campaign was  
targeted at households to promote participation.
An innovative smart enforcement approach employing location-based mobile phone technology was  
applied in the monitoring of private emptiers’ compliance. The monitoring extends from the point of  
collection to the point of disposal, and it aims to promote regular emptying as well as safe disposal. 
A process of verification of the geographic location, ownership and occupancy situation of the house-
holds that are to be part of the desludging program is in progress. This is supported by a mobile phone 
application developed by IU-WASH (e-census). The following data is collected: name of the homeowner; 
address of the house; water meter number; a photo of the front of the house and of the septic tank; 
floor plan of the house.
To control the number of households emptied, and to ensure the sludge is discharged at the sludge 
treatment plant (STP), a bar coding system is used. Using a mobile phone, the private emptier must 
scan the bar code sticker at the household at arrival and departure, and the STP plant operator scans 
the bar code sticker on the emptying truck on its arrival at the plant. To avoid cheating through scan-
ning a copy of the truck’s bar code at a location different to the STP, the mobile phone application used 
to register the bar code data also registers the location of the truck. The last scan indicates the comple-
tion of the order and the data from the phone is sent to the PDAM’s database where it is used to update 
the customer information with the completed/ incomplete orders, and to pay the private operator.
Data collected through the e-census application will also allow the PDAM to identify the proportion of 
customers who don’t have on-site systems or whose on-site systems are inappropriate/ malfunctioning, 
and design a program to address this issue. While these are all excellent innovations and stakeholders 
are enthusiastic, it is still hard work to bring all pieces of the puzzle together in a functional system. 
Some of the challenges faced so far include:
• Delays in the payment of the private emptiers by the PDAM;
• Bar code stickers getting older and not readable; 
• Loss of signal in certain locations;
• Plant operators not being present at the plant, making the private emptier wait;
• Issues with the capacity of the treatment plant to receive sludge disposed by the private emptiers 
due to poor quality of construction. 
This illustrates the potential, but also the complexity of smart enforcement, requiring a long term and 
persistent effort.
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5.3 Keeping waterways clean by preventing illegal dumping of rubbish:  
      local governments, Australia
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• combining instruments (financial penalties on illegal disposal, discounts for safe disposal, and information 
provision) that tap into a wide range of motivations and behaviours;
• a range of compliance monitoring approaches, including involving the community.
Stormwater management is a key concern for local governments (councils) in Australia. Stormwater 
runoff flushes material accumulated on surfaces including litter, dust and soil fertilisers and other  
nutrients, pesticides and other chemicals, micro-organisms, metals, oils and grease into waterways,  
and so the management of these pollutants is essential for keeping rivers, streams and oceans clean 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.14). Local governments, often with funding support from state 
governments, have implemented a range of programs to encourage, and enforce compliance with rub-
bish management laws. Councils are authorised under national government legislation (the Environment 
Protection Act, 1970) to investigate illegally dumped rubbish.
Councils recognise that dumping rubbish has many impacts including: 
• Pollution: Illegal rubbish dumping causes chemical and physical pollution of waterways and com-
munity spaces. The rubbish can block stormwater drains and can be a breeding ground for insects, 
which can spread unwanted pests and diseases. 
• Fire risk: Dumping green waste, tyres, chemicals and other flammable items can increase the risk of 
fires. 
• Safety: The dumping of sharp objects, asbestos, toxic substances, nappies and medical waste can 
have public health impacts, including children getting trapped in rubbish, especially fridges. 
• Aesthetic concerns: Dumped rubbish can make the environment unattractive.
• Cost: Every year councils in Australia spend millions of dollars of ratepayers’ money to clean up  
illegally dumped rubbish.
To prevent people from dumping their rubbish, including large items such as building materials, furni-
ture and chemicals into and waterways, councils apply multiple instruments, including voluntary  
measures, providing information to make it easier to comply, and punitive measures for non- 
compliance. These tap into a wide range of motivations that people might have for complying.  
Examples include (FRRRC): 
• Financial penalties: A removal notice is issued if the source of the rubbish is identified. If the person 
does not comply with it, they can receive a penalty of up to $8000. 
• Discount for safe disposal: Some councils provide a discount for their residents to take waste to 
specific facilities.
• Information on how to comply: Community members are provided with information on council  
websites about where they can legally take their rubbish, including recycling and recovery centres.
A wide range of compliance monitoring approaches are also used, including:
• In NSW, a new statewide database has been developed with public land managers, using smart-
phone technology to report dumping and help the state government to develop a comprehensive 
database (Sydney Morning Herald 2015).
• Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras are installed at illegal dumping hotspots (Herald Sun 
2015).
• Community members are encouraged to report people that they see illegally dumping rubbish by 
calling a 24-hour EPA pollution hotline (Frankston City Council n.d.).
• A regional illegal dumping reporting website has been created by councils on the North Coast of 
NSW, in partnership with the NSW Government (NSW EPA n.d.)
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5.4 Managing occupational safety and health hazards for manual  
      pit emptiers in Bangladesh
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• engaging non-compliers in the process of designing enforcement approaches; 
• promoting dialogue between non-compliers and regulatory agencies.
If not managed properly, manual pit emptying poses a range of health hazards to the emptiers, through 
direct contact with faeces and associated pathogens, as well as through exposure to harmful gases  
generated in septic tanks or pits (Tiwari 2008). In Bangladesh manual pit emptying is unregulated, 
harshly stigmatised and poorly paid. Manual emptiers often operate illegally without appropriate pro-
tective clothing, and are vulnerable to assault and extortion. Many also work at night to avoid objec-
tions from neighbours, and drink locally produced alcohol to cope with the odour, further increasing the 
chances of injury and accidents (SNV 2014; SNV 2015a; SNV 2015b). As a result of this situation, in 
2015 within a period of 10 months, 31 manual emptiers died while emptying pits (Prothomalo National 
Daily, 11 November 2015).
Although the importance of faecal sludge management is well recog-
nised and given high priority in national policies and strategies, it is 
remains largely neglected at the implementation level (SNV 2015a). 
Further, emptiers have a low level of awareness of the risks asso- 
ciated with their work. Thus, they are often not willing to adopt  
safety precautions (SNV 2015a; SNV 2015c).
In efforts to manage these risks, SNV has been working closely with 
national and local governments to legitimise the work of informal emptiers and promote safer sludge 
emptying practices. This has included advocating for the institutionalisation of OS&H guidelines for FSM 
and improving the knowledge and awareness of OS&H amongst pit emptiers and their employers. To 
support these efforts, and to assist with initiating dialogue with national and local government autho- 
rities, SNV developed two instruments: the ‘Occupational Safety and Health Guidelines for FSM’ and a 
‘Participation-Oriented Safety Training Manual’ for emptiers. Lists of emptiers in the SNV’s programme 
areas have been developed and endorsed by local government institutions, and up to now about 200 
emptiers have been trained on OS&H. In order to mainstream 
OS&H issues a certification process is also being discussed with 
the National Skill Development Council.
The two SNV documents were developed based on an exten-
sive field study conducted by the Bangladesh Occupational 
Safety, Health and Environment Foundation. The study  
included extensive conversations with national and local stake-
holders. These discussions, as well as field observations and 
documentation of the emptying processes, together with consultation with an OS&H expert, were  
critical to understanding what were feasible and workable health and safety practice improvements,  
and to ensuring these were reflected in the guidelines and action manual.
The OS&H guidelines state the moral and legal obligations of local government bodies and suggest 
measures to be taken by them, as well as the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders involved 
in FSM, including service recipients, NGOs and various government agencies. The training manual  
consists of a field-level trainers’ training programme designed for contractors and leaders of sludge 
emptiers, concerned work supervisors, health and hygiene personnel at city authorities, as well as  
community leaders willing to serve as OS&H trainers and/or activists in their communities.
“The pit cleaners, who belong to the lowest 
castes, are treated as outcastes. So we have 
to work towards making people accept them. 
This is a challenge for us, as part of the City 
Corporation and for them as well - to prove 
that their work is important for society.” 
  
~ Md Moniruzzaman, Mayor of Khulna
“People don’t feel like using personnel pro-
tective equipments such as boots, gloves, etc. 
They say ‘it’s too hot’ or ‘I can’t feel things 
when I wear gloves.’” 
~ Rajeev Munankami, SNV Senior Advisor  
   and Team Leader FSM Programme 
26 SNV & ISF-UTS  |  Exploring smart enforcement within urban sanitation  
5.5 Restaurant and café compliance with food safety codes, NSW, Australia 
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• Recognising the reputational motivations of businesses by providing publicly available information on compli-
ance and non-compliance; 
• Underpinning a reputational approach with fines for noncompliance. 
In the state of New South Wales in Australia, the state government regulatory authority (the NSW Food 
Authority) works with local councils to promote compliance of retail food outlets with the Food Stand-
ards Code, which is legislated nationally (Australian Government 2017). 
The Code and associated standards place a number of requirements on outlets, including (NSW Food 
Authority 2016):
• Obligations on owners to ensure that people involved in food preparation have adequate skills and 
knowledge;
• Requirements for food businesses to be designed and constructed to satisfy the requirements of the 
standards, including spaces and hand washing facilities;
• Health, hygiene, cleaning and sanitising and food handling requirements. 
The state government and local governments work together to implement a regular schedule of inspec-
tions of food outlets to check compliance with the Code.
There are two main smart compliance approaches used to encourage compliance that act to punish poor 
compliance and reward good compliance. A schedule of fines is in place for infringements, which aims 
to tap into financial motivations to incentivise compliance. However, for some organisations these fines 
may be relatively small (NSW Food Authority 2016). The scheme also recognises that retail food outlets 
rely on their reputation for continued business, and targets compliance in two ways:
• Negative reputation: A publicly available register of penalty notices; a searchable database where 
details of all businesses’ infringements and penalties are published (NSW Food Authority 2016). 
• Positive reputation: A “Scores on Doors” food safety scoring program, in which compliant food out-
lets receive a sticker to display their score results of inspections (NSW Food Authority n.d.).
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5.6 Mediation and enforcement of sanitation by-laws in urban Ghana
This case study highlights smart enforcement examples of:
• promoting dialogue and mediation between key stakeholders;
• adopting a responsive approach to facilitating compliance with by-laws before moving to prosecution of 
non-compliers.
In urban centres in Ghana, access to sanitation at the household level remains very low and residents 
often rely on public toilets, particularly in low-income communities where compound housing predo- 
minates. Landlords do not typically invest in toilets in compounds, in part due to a lack of pressure 
from either tenants or regulatory authorities. Easy access to public toilets also reduces the incentive for 
urban residents to invest in a compound toilet, or to demand a toilet from their landlords. Often, lack of 
a toilet is not sufficient to stop tenants from renting a property. Further, relevant government agencies 
have lacked the capacity to adequately enforce existing by-laws, which state that each house must have 
access to a toilet. 
In Kumasi city, in efforts to address this challenge, Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP) 
has been working closely with the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) and the Ga West Municipal  
Assembly (GWMA) in developing and implementing a five-year compound sanitation strategy. The 
strategy aims to encourage investment in toilets in compounds by landlords, for use by compound  
tenants. As owners of the property who have greater financial means and responsibility for comply-
ing with existing by-laws, landlords are the strategy’s behaviour change target group (as opposed to 
compound residents). However, the strategy also acknowledges that tenants must also be active in the 
process of acquiring the toilet.
The strategy proposes an Enforcement Management Model (figure 8), which promotes dialogue and 
mediation between tenants and landlords. The process begins with an inspection of the compound by 
an environmental health officer (EHO), which is managed by the Environmental Health and Sanitation 
Department (EHSD Town Council Head, to check if the compound has a safe toilet for use by live-in 
landlord(s) and tenant(s). If there is no safe toilet, the EHO interacts with the compound’s landlord 
and tenants to inform them of by-laws and to offer them support for getting a toilet. The process then 
moves towards the toilet sales stage (if the reception is positive) or the prosecution stage (if the recep-
tion is negative). In the sales stage, the residents are provided with technical and financial information 
and support. This is followed by a final construction stage. If the landlord and tenants refuse to comply 
or fail to take action to have a toilet installed they will be warned, given a notice, and finally prosecuted 
if they remain non-compliant.
28 SNV & ISF-UTS  |  Exploring smart enforcement within urban sanitation  
Other critical components of the strategy include mobilising municipal finance for sanitation (for  
example, by supporting EHOs to better undertake their roles), and building the supply side by  
engaging private sector suppliers and financiers. 
EHOs will be given training and access to peer-to-peer learning to help them understand the model and 
the tools available to them for enforcing existing by-laws. 
WSUP led a team of stakeholders in developing a proposal – submitted by the Municipal Chief Executive 
– which resulted in the district court agreeing to schedule one day each month to hear sanitation- 
related cases. Although this has not been a core part of the messaging to landlords, EHOs who interact 
with landlords are aware of these arrangements and can leverage this to prosecute non-compliant  
sanitary cases. 
Figure 8. Diagram of enforcement management model in Kumasi (diagram provided by WSUP)
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In many countries and contexts, the challenges of achieving safe and sustainable urban sanitation  
outcomes can seem insurmountable. At the forefront of these challenges is that of how to enforce 
regulations and standards and ensure compliant behaviour by users (households, businesses, institu-
tions) and service providers. This is particularly complex given the often limited resources available for 
enforcement, entrenched current practices, and apparent roadblocks posed by institutional, governance 
and political settings.
This paper acknowledges the complexity of challenges facing urban sanitation practitioners and the local 
governments charged with service delivery. There is no easy way or formula to achieve a “smarter” 
approach to enforcement. Indeed, our search for and documentation of examples and case studies 
revealed limited examples of comprehensive and successful enforcement strategies in complex urban 
sanitation contexts. Nevertheless, these examples, and those from other sectors, also show that many 
practitioners and governments are innovating in their approaches to motivating, incentivising and 
enforcing compliance. These cover a range of facets, including targeting scarce enforcement resources; 
combining ranges of instruments; expanding the resource base for inspections by involving citizens and 
the private sector; and trialling new technologies for licensing and monitoring. 
This paper has explored key concepts and examples that would be useful to consider when grappling 
with enforcement in urban sanitation. The applicability of concepts will vary depending on individual 
contexts. We hope that this exploration has helped encourage and inspire readers as they pursue 
effective approaches to smart enforcement in urban sanitation. 
6. Conclusion
Photo: SNV/A. Dockery
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